Louisiana Practice - Filing of Dilatory Exceptions - Waiver of Exception to Jurisdiction Ratione Personae by Caldwell, Mary Ellen
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 4
June 1955
Louisiana Practice - Filing of Dilatory Exceptions -
Waiver of Exception to Jurisdiction Ratione
Personae
Mary Ellen Caldwell
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation




of the plaintiff at that time may form the basis of a new petitory
action.15
Although the rule as illustrated by the instant case, that
res judicata includes that which might have been pleaded in a
prior suit, constitutes a departure from the strict notions of res
judicata as codified in Louisiana law, it is based upon sound
reasoning. The reduction of unnecessary and harassing litigation,
which is the objective of the doctrine of res judicata in any
litigation, 16 is even more important in cases involving title to
real property. The desirability of providing some measure of
stability regarding title to real estate 7 is ample justification
for the exception as applied in petitory actions.
David M. Ellison, Jr.
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-FILING OF DILATORY EXCEPTIONS-WAIVER
OF EXCEPTION TO JURISDICTION Ratione Personae
Plaintiff proceeded by nonresident attachment to be declared
owner of a seized certificate to do business and for damages for
loss of profits occasioned by the defendant's breach of contract
to deliver the certificate. After denial of his motion to dissolve
the attachment, defendant filed exceptions to the jurisdiction
ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae, requesting
that these exceptions "be considered in accordance with their
number and/or the order in which they appear."' On rehearing
of the appeal, held, affirmed.2 Defendant's "exceptions to juris-
15. Numerous common law jurisdictions have held that where a plain-
tiff has no knowledge or means of knowledge of the omitted items, his
ignorance will excuse him, and the judgment in the first action will not
bar a subsequent action to recover on the omitted items. See cases col-
lected in Annot., 2 A.L.R. 534 (1919).
16. Opelousas-St. Landry Securities Co. v. United States, 66 F.2d 41, 44
(5th Cir. 1933) ("Res judicata is a principle of peace. Under its influence
an end is put to controversies."); Speakman v. Bernstein, 59 F.2d 523 (5th
Cir. 1932) (general welfare and interests of state require that there be an
end to litigation); State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So.
965 (1902) (time should come when all litigation should cease).
17. Our law has traditionally sought to afford the highest protection to
innocent third parties who purchase land, relying upon a recorded transfer
or a final judicial determination of title. See Loranger v. Citizens' National
Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927); McDuffle v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51
So. 100 (1909); Brown v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1942).
1. Transcript of Record, p. 47, Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226 La.
117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
2. On the first hearing, the court held that the defendant's submission
of the two exceptions at the same time constituted a waiver of the excep-
tion to jurisdiction ratione personae and cited cases decided prior to the
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diction ratione personae and ratione materiae Were submitted to-
gether, without reservation, ' '3 and this act constituted a waiver
of the exception to jurisdiction ratione personae. Garig Transfer,
Inc. v. Harris, 226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
Under article 93 of the Code of Practice the court has held
that pleading to the merits of a case, without exception to the
jurisdiction of the court ratione personae, constitutes a waiver of
the right to plead that exception. 4 Article 333 of the Code of
Practice was amended in 19365 to provide that all dilatory excep-
tions, among which is the declinatory exception to the jurisdic-
tion ratione personae, "must be pleaded in limine litis and at one
and the same time."6 Before the Supreme Court interpreted the
amended article, two court of appeal cases dealt with the effect
of the 1936 act on the exception to jurisdiction ratione personae.
The exact wording of the exception which was sustained in
Schultz v. Long Island Machinery and Equipment Co.7 is set
forth in the opinion in that case. Defendant's exception embodied
a reference to the impropriety of the form of the citation, but the
court said that the fact that the plea to jurisdiction was insisted
upon, tried, and passed upon without consideration or trial of the
alternative plea,8 fully preserved the exceptor's rights under
the plea to the jurisdiction. In Browne v. Gajan9 the court of
appeal again had occasion to consider the effect of the 1936 act
and sustained an exception to jurisdiction ratione personae. The
court's description of the documents filed shows that this excep-
tion and another exception were filed together, but in the alter-
1936 amendment of article 333 of the Code of Practice requiring submission
of all declinatory exceptions at the same time. Rehearing was granted
because defendant urged the effect of act 124 of 1936 and insisted that he
had complied with the requirements of the act and State v. Younger, 206
La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944), by filing his exceptions in the alternative. In
view of the facts that the court concurred with the finding of the district
judge that the court had jurisdiction of the res, the certificate, which was
sufficient foundation for the declaration of ownership of the certificate, and,
further, that the plea for damages was dismissed as of nonsuit, a determi-
nation of the validity of the exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae
may not have been essential to the decision of this case. Nevertheless,
because the court granted a rehearing to consider the alleged error of
law in the original opinion this case was felt to be worthy of consideration.
3. Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 75 So.2d 28, 34 (La. 1954).
4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102, 171 So. 708 (1936)
and other cases cited at 1 MCMAHON, LOuISIANA PRACTICE 303, nn. 48, 49 (1939).
5. La. Acts 1936, No. 124, p. 386.
6. Art. 333, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
7. 173 So. 569, 570 (La. App. 1937).
8. The trial court had held that the reference to defective citation was
not an exception. The Supreme Court neither affirmed nor reversed that
holding specifically, but referred to the reference as an "alternative plea."
9. 173 So. 485, 487 (La. App. 1937).
NOTES
native. The court emphasized that, although the two separate
documents were filed simultaneously, the exception to jurisdic-
tion ratione personae was filed solely for that purpose and with-
out submitting to the jurisdiction, and that in the accompanying
exception, exceptor expressly denied the waiver or abandon-
ment of the other exception filed. Both of these cases were noted
without comment by the Supreme Court in the instant case.' 0
In State v. Younger" the Supreme Court displayed the same
liberality which was shown in the decisions of the courts of
appeal. The court record in the Younger case shows that the
defendant's first sentence declined jurisdiction ratione personae,
giving the grounds therefor.12 Immediately following the single
exception, the "exceptor pray[ed] that this exception be main-
tained," and introduced his additional exceptions with this para-
graph: "And, now, with full reservation of the foregoing
exception and without in any way waiving the same, but solely
to comply with the requirements of Act 124 of 1936, exceptor
presents, in the alternative, the following additional exceptions:
. ". ..- The court approved the use of this language and it has
become the accepted method of pleading the declinatory excep-
tion to jurisdiction ratione personae and all other declinatory and
dilatory exceptions "at the same time,'' 14 without waiving the
former.
If the three cases discussed above may be said to embody the
pleading requirements for filing dilatory exceptions in the alter-
native, it is interesting to compare the language of the excep-
tions used in the instant case:
"Now into Court . . . c6mes [exceptor] appearing herein
solely for the purpose of these exceptions and reserving all
rights, particularly to answer, and requesting that the ex-
ceptions be considered in accordance with their number
and/or the order in which they appear excepts:
"(1) To the jurisdiction ratione personae.
"(2) To the jurisdiction ratione materiae.
10. 75 So.2d 28, 34 (La. 1954).
11. 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944).
12. "Now . . . comes [exceptor's name and address] sought to be made
defendant herein, who declines the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
on the ground that his domicile is in the Parish of .... ." Transcript of
Record, p. 1, exceptions, State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944).
13. Ibid.
14. See LA. STATE BAR Ass'N, LOUISIANA FORMULARY ANNOTATED 83 (1951).
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"Wherefore, exceptor prays that these exceptions be main-
tained ....
"And for all general and equitable relief.
"And now without in any manner waiving the benefit of
the foregoing exceptions [defendant here urged several addi-
tional exceptions].' 15 (Emphasis added.)
The court stated that the first two exceptions "were submitted
together, without reservation, and with the prayer that these
exceptions be maintained .. ".."16 However, in its statement of
facts the court noted that defendant, in filing the additional
exceptions, had reserved his rights under the exceptions to
jurisdiction. Apparently, the court felt that the reservation
mentioned in its statement of facts applied to the first two excep-
tions taken together, and that it did not identify the exception to
the jurisdiction ratione personae with the requisite particularity.
This view is supported by the fact that the exceptor filed his
additional exceptions without "waiving the benefit of the fore-
going exceptions." The conclusion reached by the court may
find additional support in the fact that by referring to "these
exceptions," the exceptor was treating them conjunctively and
alternatively only with reference to the subsequent exceptions.
The joinder of the two exceptions was apparently viewed as the
fatal "filing together," although the exceptor's intention to
present the exceptions alternatively and disjunctively could have
been inferred from his request that they "be considered in
accordance with their number and/or the order in which they
appear."' 17
Whether these strict and highly technical requirements of
pleading are justifiable in order to preserve the legal fiction
which permits a defendant to come into court to resist suit with-
out submitting to jurisdiction ratione personae may be debatable.
Nevertheless, that the court will carefully scrutinize pleadings to
detect a waiver is a fact with which the practitioner must deal.
In the light of the instant decision, the exceptor may find a
thorough review of the Younger, Browne and Schultz cases a pre-
requisite to the drafting of a waiver-proof exception to juris-
diction ratione personae.
Mary Ellen Caldwell
15. Transcript of Record, p. 47, Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226 La.
117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
16. 75 So.2d 28, 34 (La. 1954).
17. See note 15 supra.
